Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Found to Permit Vicarious Liability
The case arose out of a dispute between two competing investment advisory firms, Charles Schwab & Co. and Acorn Advisory Management. In 2004 Schwab put its investment analytics division up for sale. After Acorn made an unsuccessful bid for the division, it hired its information technology director, Brian Carter, from the company. By virtue of his position, Carter had access to virtually all the division’s confidential, proprietary information stored on its computer network. At Acorn’s request, before leaving Schwab, Carter duplicated large amounts of data from the division’s servers and transmitted such to Acorn. Upon discovering Carter’s actions, Schwab filed suit against both Carter and Acorn, alleging violations of CFAA, as well as trade secret misappropriation and common law conversion, breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment. Acorn filed a motion for summary judgment on the misappropriation of trade secrets claim and a motion to dismiss the remaining claims. The federal court denied both motions.
Since Acorn did not directly access Schwab’s computer network, the court was compelled to consider whether the statute permits a claim for vicarious liability. In the absence of express provision in the statute for vicarious liability the court relied on analogous authority as well as its interpretation of the intent of the statute. Citing a Supreme Court’s Meyer v. Holley decision, which construed the Fair Housing Act to permit vicarious liability in the absence of express statutory authorization, the court in Schwab reasoned that legislation establishing a tort action ordinarily is intended to incorporate traditional vicarious liability principals. Since the CFAA is intended to compensate victims of computer fraud, the court concluded that the Act essentially creates a tort action. Furthermore, permitting a cause of action against a company that deliberately encouraged a third party to gain unlawful access to a plaintiff’s computer network would advance the statute’s purpose of punishing access to unauthorized data. Given these conclusions and the fact that the court could find no indication of contrary congressional intent, the court held that vicarious liability could be maintained under CFAA.
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